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III. Securitizing Borderless Diseases 
The case of Ebola in Sierra Leone 
by Christoffer Jakshøj, Mie Nielsen & Sofie Hansen 
 
This chapter investigates how the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak was securitised, and in turn 
how this securitization affected the sovereignty and development of Sierra Leone. Drawing 
on the Copenhagen School theory on securitization combined with Elbe’s notions of 
Medicalized Insecurity the chapter examines the process of securitising the Ebola outbreak. 
Hereafter the concept of Medicalised Nativism is applied to provide insight into the everyday 
effects of the outbreak on locals and to provide insight into the narratives of the outbreak and 
their influence on creating stigmatisation and discrimination. The chapter finds that the 
outbreak have affected both sovereignty and development in Sierra Leone, when considering 
power relations, narratives, and the processes of securitisation and bordering.  
  
Keywords: Ebola; Sierra Leone; Securitization; Medicalization; Power Relations;  
Medicalised Nativism 
 
This chapter examines how the traditional understanding of borders, in the sense of nation 
states, is being contested by diseases shown through the case of the recent Ebola Virus 
Disease (hereafter referred to as Ebola) outbreak. Through the borderless nature of the 
disease, different kinds of cross-border flows are opened up for, such as power, ideas, people, 
and material. Furthermore, this chapter will elaborate on the recent Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa with a focus on Sierra Leone, and investigate how this outbreak was securitized by 
different actors through a range of speech-acts. This chapter will contribute to the book with 
the argument that diseases such as Ebola contest the classical understanding of borders in the 
sense of the nation state, herein how nation-state borders not necessarily work in the sense of 
stopping people or diseases from crossing borders, and how this is dealt with in terms of 
securitization and efforts of containment. That is, how speech-acts from international actors 
can influence the securitization of a certain issue in a country, and thereby effect said 
country’s sovereignty and development. 
 
The known history of Ebola dates back to 1976 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), where 318 people were infected with the Zaire virus (an Ebola substring) through 
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close personal contact and contaminated equipment used in hospitals and clinics. The same 
year 284 people in Sudan were infected with the Sudan virus (a different Ebola substring), 
again in connection to hospitals. Furthermore, one case of the Sudan virus was detected in 
England in a laboratory accident. Since 1976 multiple cases of Ebola have been detected 
around the world, mostly in African countries such as DRC, Sudan, Uganda, and Gabon, 
where both numbers of infected and deaths several times have surpassed 100. Cases of Ebola 
have been registered in the US, Russia and Italy, however these cases all happened within 
laboratories or containment areas often by transmission from test animals infected with the 
virus. The first case of Ebola in the latest outbreak was detected in March 2014 and has been 
the worst in history affecting multiple countries in Africa, Europe, and North America, with 
the worst affected countries being Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, where more than 
11,000 people have died (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2015a). 
 
The first cases of Ebola in an outbreak are often linked to contact with infected animals such 
as fruit bats or primates. Thereafter the virus spreads from human to human via blood and 
other body fluids (CDC, 2015b). It is believed that the first case of the current Ebola outbreak 
stems from a transfer of the virus from a fruitbat to a child, as it took place in a region, where 
eating wild animals, including bats, is common practice. Meat from wild animals is known as 
bushmeat and if these animals happen to carry the virus, the people in direct contact with 
them are in danger of contamination and further spread to other people. This risk resulted in a 
ban from the government of Sierra Leone on hunting and selling bush meat, but due to strong 
traditions and lack of alternatives to the meat, this ban was often broken by locals (Doyle, 
2015). Albeit it being almost certain that the virus originated from this bat-to-human transfer, 
it is important to keep in mind that bushmeat is not the biggest risk and that human-to-human 
contact has been the main problem regarding the spread. This is argued by anthropology 
Professor Melissa Leach, who stresses that human contact have been far more crucial than 
eating bushmeat and that “(...) negative coverage of bushmeat has deterred people from 
understanding the real risk of infection.” (Leach in Hogenboom, 2014). The further human-
to-human spread of the virus has been boosted by a health system with limited capacity. Lack 
of resources, information, and skilled health workers have increased the spread as it was 
difficult to contain and treat the infected. This inadequate health system is to be regarded in a 
context of severe civil wars, which for a long time have resulted in both a weak health sector 
and mistrust towards health workers. The disease has furthermore been spread due to the 
difficulty of containment and control. 
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This chapter will be divided into four parts, which all serve to answer the posed research 
question: 
  
How was the Ebola Virus Disease outbreak securitized, and which effects did this have on 
development and sovereignty in Sierra Leone? 
 
The first part offers an overview of the recent Ebola outbreak by providing a timemap of the 
development and the response from different actors. This will be done by drawing on a range 
of empirical material from different actors, including but not limited to the government of 
Sierra Leone, WHO, and NGOs. The second part presents the theoretical frame for the 
chapter and the relevance of securitization in relation to the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in Sierra 
Leone. Drawing on the Copenhagen School of security theory by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, 
and Jaap de Wilde (1998), this part investigates the securitization as a process through 
speech-acts. In addition to this, Stefan Elbe’s Medicalization of Insecurity (2011) will specify 
the relevance of merging health and security. The third part will elaborate on the arguments 
by Stefan Elbe (2011) addressing the consequences of said medicalization of insecurity in 
relation to the Ebola outbreak. This is based on arguments from previous outbreaks of 
borderless diseases, as well as a discussion of power relations and categorization of 
individuals, groups, or communities, drawing on writings by Priscilla Wald (2008). The final 
part will discuss the notion of Human Security in relation to the findings in the previous 
sections by addressing issues concerning sovereignty and development in Sierra Leone, seen 
through a postcolonial, and a critical perspective. 
 
The analysis and discussion on securitization of the Ebola outbreak will maintain a focus on 
Sierra Leone. This choice of case was narrowed down to the three main countries affected by 
the virus, that is Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone was eventually chosen, as 
there was a unique way of securitizing during the outbreak compared to that of Liberia and 
Guinea - quarantine zones and deployment of foreign military personnel in the country to 
name a few. On top of this, information from the government of Sierra Leone was accessible 
and transparent, which was, for instance, not the case with the government of Guinea. The 
analysis of Sierra Leone could be further expanded through a comparative analysis between 
Sierra Leone and Liberia in order to examine the differences between the countries’ 
responses, securitizations, and outcomes. 
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The chapter will take its basis within a poststructural philosophy of science, but 
methodologically the theory applied in this chapter is based on an eclectic philosophy of 
science; both poststructural/postmodern as well as a realistic. We state this, as to be 
transparent in our way of working, thus providing information with which to understand how 
theories and scholars are applied. 
 
The Outbreak 
In December 2013 the first case of Ebola was detected when a two year old boy in Guinea 
died, followed by the death of his family. On the 25th of May 2014 the Government of Sierra 
Leone declared an outbreak of Ebola in the Kailahun district in the eastern region of Sierra 
Leone, a province bordering Guinea and Liberia; both of which had already recognised 
outbreaks of Ebola two months prior (Government of Sierra Leone, 2014, p. 2). On the 7th of 
November 2015 Sierra Leone was declared Ebola free, and by then the country had 
experienced 8,704 confirmed cases of Ebola, 287 probable, and 5,131 suspected cases. Albeit 
these numbers might be higher (e.g. Williams, 2015), they show the severity of the outbreak. 
These cases have lead to a total of 3,955 deaths in the span of one and a half year (WHO, 
2015). After the outbreak in Sierra Leone, the virus spread to Nigeria on July 27th, USA on 
September 30th, Spain on October 6th, Mali on October 23rd, and Senegal on November 3rd, 
while simultaneously spreading further in the three first countries (WHO, 2014a). This 
timeline is highlighted as it informs the later analysis of the process of securitization.   
 
On the 22nd of March 2014 the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) launched their emergency 
response to Guinea as a reaction to the continuous spreading since the first outbreak three 
months earlier. The response involved expansion of the Ebola MSF staff and the shipping of 
33 tons of supplies in order to contain the virus. On June 2nd 2014 MSF medics expanded 
their work to Eastern Sierra Leone, where the virus had been spreading for less than two 
weeks. By the 7th of July 2014 they had established a 50 bed treatment centre in Kailahun in 
order to treat and contain the ongoing virus, which had by then infected 45 people and killed 
12 (MSF, 2014).  
 
A month later than MSF, in April 2014, WHO responded to the outbreak in Guinea by 
providing medical supplies and health care in the country. On April 8th the Assistant 
Director-General in Health Security of WHO, Dr. Keiji Fukuda stated “This is one of the 
5 
most challenging Ebola outbreaks that we have ever faced and right now we have 
documented cases, both in Guinea and Liberia” (WHO, 2014b). The first official statement, 
however, on Ebola was not until October 2014 - eight months after the first incident and five 
months after the governments of Liberia and Guinea had detected outbreaks, only four days 
before the death toll reached 1,000 people (Davis, 2014; WHO, 2014b). Williams argues this 
to be due to the infection of two American health workers (Williams, 2015), which at best is 
speculative albeit believable. Whether true or not, the essential thing to note is how late 
WHO made an official statement, and thus made their first public response.  
 
The United States launched their first response to the Ebola outbreak in March 2014, 
however the first press release on the issue was not published until September 16th, following 
a statement by President Barack Obama. By this date, more than 100 US specialists were 
deployed in West Africa and more than 100 million dollars had been spent on the response 
plan, including strategies to control the epidemic at its source in West Africa and fortifying 
global health security infrastructure in the region and beyond (The White House, 2014). 
 
The government of Sierra Leone responded to the first signs of Ebola in May 2014 by 
launching a response plan aiming to stop the transmission and prevent further spread. This 
was to happen through; 1) Immediate outbreak response interventions, 2) Enhance 
coordination and collaboration, and 3) Scaling-up of human and financial resources 
mobilization (Government of Sierra Leone, 2014, p. 3) The budget for Sierra Leone's national 
operational plan over a six month period was estimated to be $25,817,130. The amount 
pledged by donors and partners was $7,658,180 and in addition to this, the Government of 
Sierra Leone pledged $10,000,000, leaving a gap of $8,258,949 (Government of Sierra Leone 
2014, p. 4). 
 
In November 2014 the National Ebola Response Coordination (NERC) released Standard 
Operational Procedures (SOP’s) in order to manage and optimize quarantine procedures in 
the country. The function of quarantines is to secure areas with a high spread of Ebola 
through containing the disease, tracing the spread, and securing that burials are carried out 
safely. The NERC states that the procedures are often misunderstood and that there therefore 
is a strong need for “(...) a written policy that clearly suggests when quarantines should be 
considered, how quarantines will be approved, and what steps need to be taken to ensure that 
quarantines are effective and safe” (NERC, 2014, p. 2). The paper on the SOP’s by NERC 
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form this policy by mapping all the steps in the procedure in order to secure both safety and 
respect for human rights. The British NGO Oxfam argue that if the quarantine procedures of 
NERC are compiled to, the quarantines may be highly effective in saving lives and 
eradicating Ebola. However, if the quarantines are poorly managed, safety may be 
compromised, as people violate restrictions and do not report cases of illness and death. 
Oxfam carried out an extensive analysis of the quarantine procedures in Sierra Leone and 
conclude that “(...) government-controlled quarantine strategies are believed to have played 
an important role in the drastic drop in the number of confirmed cases, alongside other 
measures such as treatment centres and social mobilization.” (Oxfam, 2014, p. 2). However, 
they find a disconnect between the SOP’s and the practice of the quarantines, violation of 
basic rights of the quarantined, poor response from Ebola support structures, and a lack of 
awareness of the SOP’s by various stakeholders. Oxfam recognize that the quarantine 
procedures in Sierra Leone is a measure of last resort, but stress the importance of respect for 
human rights, especially in a time of crisis (Oxfam, 2014, p. 3). The implications of 
quarantine zones in the process of securitization will be investigated further later on.  
 
According to the government of Sierra Leone, there were numerous challenges in responding 
to the outbreak, including mistrust of public health workers, difficulty tracing bordering 
between Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, with the added challenge of finding the necessary 
capacities and structures; both human, financial, operational, and logistics (Government of 
Sierra Leone, 2014). These challenges are stated in the WHO statement of the 8th of August 
2014 as fragile health systems, lack of financial and material resources, inexperience in 
dealing with Ebola as well as a lack of understanding of the disease. A population with high 
mobility across borders alongside inadequate facilities and practices to control the disease 
pose additional challenges, which, amongst other, resulted in a high degree of infected 
healthcare workers (WHO, 2014b). MSF further argue for the challenges of the high mobility 
across borders: “‘For the local population, the border hardly exists,’ says Els Adams, MSF’s 
outreach nurse in Kambia [in Sierra Leone]. ‘There are at least 34 different crossing points, 
and probably even more. People identify with the region rather than the country’.” (MSF, 
2015). This is a problem for the tracking and handling of Ebola due to a lack of cross-border 
and regional cooperation between the affected countries. This is expressed by Røttingen et. 
al. (2014) as the lack of national capacities alongside the borderlessness of the disease pose 
serious challenges when trying to prevent further spreading. Due to this there is a need for an 
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agreement within the global community that investments in building domestic capacities in 
poorer countries are necessary (Røttingen et. al., 2014). 
 
Securitization of Health  
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) are the main contributors to the Copenhagen School on 
security. In their main work, simply titled “Security”, they argue that security is a concept 
that forms a new framework for analysis of political relations in five different sectors; 
military, political, economic, societal, and environmental (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998). 
They state that security, in the traditional political-military understanding of the word, 
inherently concerns survival and that an issue may be considered a security issue when it is 
“(...) presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” (Buzan, 
Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 21), which then justifies extraordinary emergency measures. Elbe 
(2011) adds to this by arguing that the same is the case in the health sector; when a certain 
disease, epidemic, or other health concern become so widespread that a securitizing actor 
may identify it as posing an existential threat to a population, emergency measures will be 
resorted to, as it will be argued to be the case of the recent Ebola outbreak. 
 
In the actor and analyst approach to analyzing securitization, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 
identifies three units of analysis: 
1. Referent objects: the objects existentially threatened 
2. Securitizing actors: the actors that declare the objects existentially threatened 
3. Functional actors: the actors that affect the dynamics of a sector, be it military, 
political, economic, societal, environmental (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36) 
or, medical (Elbe 2011). 
 
In the case of the Ebola outbreak, the referent objects are people exposed to the disease, as 
well as people fearing the disease. How these people are identified is, however, a quite 
complex procedure, as it will be discussed later on. The securitizing actors in this case are the 
government of Sierra Leone, governments of the USA and other countries, WHO alongside 
other international organizations. There have been multiple functional actors, but the ones 
focused on in this chapter are the government of Sierra Leone, the government of USA, 
WHO, and MSF, as they have been some of the main actors during the outbreak.  
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The securitization process: Speech-acts 
The definition of speech-acts is somewhat unclear, in this chapter however, the concept will 
be understood in accordance to both Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) and Williams 
(2003). This entails an understanding of speech-acts as being more than just speech, 
encompassing writing, images, and other forms of communication such as modern media. 
 
Identifying the existential threat and emergency measure of an issue will depend on the 
sector in which the issue occurs. Common to all sectors is the fact that the actor defines what 
poses the threat and that the meaning of the concept lies within the usage rather than the 
formal definition. However the existential threats are defined, any securitization of an issue is 
a move that takes politics beyond the established rules, thus calling for emergency measures 
(Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, pp. 20-24). A certain power lies within the authority to 
define the existential threat to a designated referent object: “Security is thus very much a 
structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being 
generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security.” (Bigo 1994, 
1996 in Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 31). Furthermore, the authors stress that this 
process merely characterizes the move of securitization and that the actual securitization 
process happens when the audience accepts the identification of a threat: “In security 
discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by 
labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary 
means.” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26). In the case of the recent Ebola outbreak, 
important securitizing actors in the creation of the disease as an existential threat have 
amongst others been WHO, the US President Barack Obama alongside the White House 
office, and the government of Sierra Leone. In the sector of health, WHO is an important 
actor as they, in situations of threats towards the global health, have the role of directing and 
coordination international health efforts within the member states of the United Nations. It is 
the role of WHO to measure and observe in order to control and respond to emerging diseases 
and epidemics, which makes WHO an accepted actor in the international regime of health. 
On the 8th of August 2014 WHO released a statement on the basis of a meeting of the 
Emergency Committee convened by the Director-General under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR). The Committee advised that: 
 
● the Ebola outbreak in West Africa constitutes an ‘extraordinary event’ and a public 
health risk to other States; 
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● the possible consequences of further international spread are particularly serious in 
view of the virulence of the virus, the intensive community and health facility 
transmission patterns, and the weak health systems in the currently affected and most 
at-risk countries. 
● a coordinated international response is deemed essential to stop and reverse the 
international spread of Ebola.  
(WHO, 2014b) 
 
Based on this, it was unanimously decided that the Ebola outbreak met the conditions for  
Public Health Emergency of International Concern. 
 
In 2005 a revise of the IHR was agreed upon, which incorporated three new diseases; 
HIV/AIDS, SARS, and H5N1 influenza. This revise meant that public health threats were 
defined more widely to incorporate any extraordinary public health event that could be seen 
as a threat. The revision was made to include disease with potential to spread globally, thus in 
need of an international response (Elbe, 2011, p. 855). No comments shall here be made on 
the fact that HIV/AIDS was only incorporated into the IHR at this time. In the WHO 
statement from August 8th 2014 the Committee addresses the Ebola outbreak in accordance 
to the revised IHR of 2005, thus making the outbreak an international issue. This statement 
can be regarded as a speech-act and refers to Ebola as a risk to both public health in the 
affected countries as well as to other not yet affected countries, hence an existential threat to 
said objects.  
 
Adding to the securitization of Ebola, President Obama stated in a press conference on the 
17th of September 2014 that if the Ebola outbreak was not controlled it could lead to: 
 
"(...) profound political, economic and security implications for all of us. (...) this is an 
epidemic which is not just a threat to regional security, it is a potential threat to global 
security if these countries break down, if their economies break down, if people panic, that 
has profound effects on all of us (...)” (BBC, 2014a).  
 
In this speech-act there is a clear discourse of Ebola as a direct threat to all, moreover there is 
made a clear link between health and the more classic security concerns, such as political and 
economic issues as presented by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998). 
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In dealing with the Ebola outbreak, and as a response to his own statement, US President 
Obama positioned 3,000 American troops to the three most affected countries, Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, in order to create stability and to build treatment centers and train 
medical personnel to deal with the outbreak (BBC, 2014a). In addition to this, the UNDP 
stated in a press release on the 25th of November 2014 that they would reach out to 2,000 
local security personnel, local authorities, and civilians in Sierra Leone to train them in 
collaboration with the national government. This training entailed information on Ebola 
prevention and on how to handle quarantined communities and checkpoints in accordance to 
human rights (UNDP, 2014). Moreover, the government of Sierra Leone created quarantined 
areas in order to stop further spread of the virus. These quarantine zones have directly 
affected approximately 1.5 million people, especially in border areas as to stop travelling 
between Sierra Leone and Guinea. In addition to this, 14 districts have been under curfew, 
and as a result of this travelling corridors around this area have been established with a no-
travelling rule outside the timespan of 9am to 5pm (O’Carroll, 2014). 
 
In the case of the Ebola outbreak, the securitizing actors and the functional actors have to a 
large extend been the same, as the actors with the power to securitize are often the actors with 
the ability and resources to respond, hence WHO, the US and the national government of 
Sierra Leone. This securitization has affected the national population in the sense that their 
ability to move have been limited by quarantine zones. By letting foreign military troops in 
the power dynamics within the country have changed, the effects of which will be further 
discussed and investigated in the section of ‘Human Security and Sovereignty ’. 
 
Medicalization of Insecurity  
In his article “Pandemics on the Radar Screen” (2011) Stefan Elbe, along with several other 
scholars, concur that in recent years there have been an ongoing securitization of health. Elbe 
finds that the rise of health security has led to a medicalization of insecurity, meaning that the 
contemporary practice of security is being transformed by the increasing impact from the 
intersections between health and security (Elbe, 2011, p. 848). As a result of medicalization 
of the field Elbe identifies three changes in the practice of security regarding 1) what security 
is, 2) who can practice security, and 3) how security is provided. These three changes are to a 
large extent consistent with the points of analysis offered above by Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde.  
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Firstly, the increasing intersection means that security is redefined as a medical problem, as a 
result of an idea that “(...) insecurity is no longer caused solely by the military capabilities 
and hostile political intentions of other states; it is similarly brought about today by the 
presence and rapid circulation of disease within and across populations” (Elbe, 2011, p. 
849). The argument that security is more than the five traditional understandings presented by 
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde is made clear through the recent Ebola outbreak. Diseases such 
as Ebola are invisible, which offers a new kind of security threat as it is difficult to contain 
within borders, especially in the globalized world of today, where airplanes create possibility 
for diseases to spread across regional borders as well as across continents. During the Ebola 
outbreak the nature of the disease, along with fear of spread, resulted in a renewed 
strengthening of borders, hence a process of bordering to contain and to restrict. This 
restriction of people's ability to cross borders can be seen in the example given by Robert J. 
Pijpers as he states that: “(...) as a response to the Ebola crisis, a variety of countries 
implemented strict visa regulations for people coming from all over Africa.” (Pijpers, 2014). 
This argument is reflected in the aforementioned statement by the US President Obama in 
which he declares Ebola a security issue for “all of us”. The increased restriction and security 
in bordering are related to the way the disease spread through humans and through them 
across borders. This was exemplified when the Liberian government official Patrick Sawyer 
flew to Nigeria where he died in the airport of Ebola. This dramatic transportation of the 
virus caused panic, and was the instance that caused the Liberian government to form a 
serious response (Williams, 2015). 
 
The second change concerns the securitizing actors; according to Elbe the health-security 
debates have allowed a growing number of medicals and health experts to play a larger role 
in security policy, thus changing the notion of which actors may practice security (Elbe, 
2011, p. 853). In addition to the aforementioned securitization actors are non-governmental 
organisations such as the MSF and independent medical experts. 
 
Third, Elbe argues that health security has encouraged changes in the way security is 
provided; as it has been globalized, the security of populations no longer rely solely on 
traditional security institutions. Instead, “To ensure the maximum protection for their 
populations, governments will also need proactively to develop, acquire and stockpile a 
range of medical countermeasures in order to defend and secure populations in the event of a 
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pandemic” (Elbe, 2011, p. 856) and “(...) through recourse to a growing array of 
pharmacological interventions.” (Elbe, 2011, p. 849). As insecurity has been medicalized, 
preparedness for pandemics become at the core of providing security, replacing the 
traditional notions. This argument does to some extend hold true, as seen in the case of the 
H1N1 virus where the British and other European governments stockpiled anti-flu medicine 
in order to secure the population against the virus (Elbe, 2011). The problem with this 
medicalization of insecurities in the case of the H1N1 virus in the UK was that people, not 
infected with the particular virus, demanded the anti-flu medicine. The overmedication as a 
way to create a feeling of security can have unforeseen consequences as viruses mutate to 
survive, thus making the particular anti-virus medicine obsolete for further outbreaks.   
 
The stockpiling of medicine and other medical equipment was not the case in Sierra Leone or 
any of the other Ebola infected countries. One factor in the response to the Ebola outbreak 
was a lack of commitment to international health security standards in Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone, thus a weak health sector and infrastructure, and a lack of resources as the 
proportion of physicians per 1,000 capita in Sierra Leone was 0.022 (Akukwe, 2015, p. 2). 
Hence to not understand the weak nature of the national health sector mentioned above as a 
solely national issue, but to incorporate into that notions of global inequality and a lack of 
global assistance to the countries’ health sectors. The fact is that there are not a cure nor a 
vaccine for Ebola, albeit it being known since the 1970s. Heyman (2015) argues that Ebola 
showcases an ill-suited medical research and development model, and that said model is 
inadequate in addressing international health security priorities and stresses that market 
forces are not able to regulate this. Gostin (2015) elaborates on this by stating 
“Pharmaceutical companies had little incentive to invest in countermeasures for 
unpredictable outbreaks in poor countries. Even major government and philanthropic 
funders often overlooked diseases with low global burdens” (Gostin, 2015, p. 1906) 
Furthermore, Jens Pedersen, humanitarian adviser for MSF, comments on the unequal 
reaction, depending on which people the disease affects: “(…) Ebola so far have not really 
affected white people, there have been no economic interest in developing a treatment or 
vaccine for the disease”  (Pedersen, in Kjeldtoft 2015, p. 14, translated from Danish by 
authors). 
 
All of this show how both state actors as well as actors from the medical industry have the 
power to decide which diseases should be treated or securitized, from the over-treatment of 
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the H1N1 virus in the West to the under-treatment of the Ebola virus in the Global South.  
Due to the fast spread of the Ebola virus across borders WHO and other actors have turned 
the outbreak into an issue of security for the affected West-african countries as well as the 
rest of the world. This has lead to a discussion within the WHO on to which extent it is 
ethically right to use untested medicine on Ebola patients. 
  
“The recent treatment of two health workers from Samaritan’s Purse with experimental 
medicine has raised questions about whether medicine that has never been tested and shown 
to be safe in people should be used in the outbreak and, given the extremely limited amount of 
medicine available, if it is used, who should receive it.” (WHO, 2014c) 
 
This question of whether the medicine should be used and if so whom should receive it, is a 
question of power, a question of who has the power to decide which individuals are the best 
candidates for the medicine. It is not sought to give an answer this issue, however it is argued 
that the discourses surrounding the Ebola outbreak have implications for the medical and 
political choices made in this regard.   
 
Outbreak narratives, stigmatization, and borders 
 
“The outbreak narrative is a powerful story of ecological danger and epidemiological 
belonging, and as it entangles analyses of disease emergence and changing social and 
political formations, it affects the experience of both” (Wald, 2008, p. 33) 
 
As explicated above a powerful discourse can be found when talking of outbreaks such as 
Ebola, and therein a discourse of whom is responsible for the disease. In the book 
Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative (2008) Priscilla Wald argues 
that the narratives surrounding epidemiological outbreaks have consequences of creating 
stigmatization of individuals, groups or populations, as seen in the case of SARS and 
HIV/AIDS (Wald, 2008, p. 3), or as seen in the recent outbreak with the narrative of 
bushmeat. Through the media and international organizations such as WHO, an extreme 
global panic was quickly spread during the SARS outbreak in 2003, creating a fundamental 
fear of human contact in an increasingly interlinked world. WHO declared the SARS 
epidemic “a worldwide health threat” (Wald, 2008, p. 4) as the disease rapidly spreads 
across borders, mainly through air travel. The same was the case during the Ebola outbreak, 
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where strict airport controls and, in some cases, travel bans were in place. This action can be 
categorized as a speech-act, in which SARS and Ebola respectively were securitized in that 
they were articulated as threats - as seen in the 2005 IHR revise. Wald’s argument on the 
paramount fear of other people holds true in the case of Ebola as well. Anyone could be the 
person to infect, and possibly kill, you and your family - even if they were on the other side 
of the planet, as especially SARS proved to be a borderless disease. This proved only true to 
a lesser extent with Ebola; it did spread from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to but not 
within other countries. 
 
Drawing on the term Medicalized Nativism by Alan Kraut, Wald describes how fear of 
diseases is used as an argument in anti-immigration discourses through “(...) the almost 
superstitious belief that national borders can afford protection against communicable disease 
[sic]” (Kraut in Wald, 2008, p. 8). Thus, fear of diseases becomes another xenophobic aspect 
in the stigmatization of ethnic or cultural groups and another brick in building higher walls by 
the borders. Medicalized nativism is, as Wald argues, rooted in cultural differences and the 
idea that other ethnic and cultural groups’ primitive practices cause the wide spread of 
diseases. These primitive practices are often understood in the context of poverty. Global 
networks thus become both the threat and the solution; while the increasing interlinking of 
the world furthers the spread of disease, technology and global cooperation help contain and 
treat the disease. In the case of Ebola a central issue has been the traditional burial practices 
of victims, which have been the source of approximately 20% of the spread, as the local 
customs often include a lot of physical contact with the deceased, such as washing, hugging, 
or kissing the dead body. Additionally, religious customs and beliefs created conflicts 
between locals and health workers, as described in the case of the death of a Guinean 
pregnant woman: “If she was to be saved from eternal wandering and reach the village of the 
dead, they insisted, her fetus must be removed. Impossible, the outsiders said. Her virus-
laden blood was far too contagious for anyone to cut into her body.” (Maxmen, 2015). 
Therefore an important part of WHO’s Ebola containment programme has been controlled 
burial practices without direct contact with the bodies. WHO published a protocol on the 
subject, emphasizing the importance of respecting local customs of tradition and religion 
(WHO, 2014d, p. 1). This attempt to take local practices into account is an example of respect 
for local customs, which might be key in creating cooperation between the interventionists 
and the locals. However, the matter of identifying the local burial practices as a central part of 
the problem (albeit it being factual) may increase the discourse of primitive practices and the 
15 
stigmatization of the West African people as culturally backward, in need of global assistance 
to survive the disease thriving in their society. This narrative of the global society rescuing 
yet another African country carries notions of post-colonialism, as it can be found in Wald’s 
discussion of primitive health practices being linked with poverty. The securitization of the 
burial procedures may therefore in itself represent a speech-act, furthering the stereotyping 
and stigmatization of African people as helpless and primitive. Burials, however, encompass 
a different narrative at the same time, dividing the local population in healthy and diseased. 
Williams (2015) shares the story of “Kartoon”, a local burying victims of Ebola who said 
“(...) they sometimes had to take off their personal protective equipment and wear ordinary 
clothes to bury the dead because they were afraid people would chase them out of 
graveyards.” (Williams, 2015). Following the argument of Wald, the narrative of outbreaks 
creates a notion of global networks being part of the solution, it can furthermore create stigma 
and fear within a population. The former have proved to be the case in the Ebola outbreak, as 
Sierra Leone has relied heavily on foreign assistance, as exemplified in the budget for their 
Ebola response plan, in which $7,658,180 of the budget is committed by donors and partners 
(Government of Sierra Leone, 2014, p. 4). Published November 22nd 2015, the report of the 
Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, found that albeit the 
international society committed US$ 5 billion, it remains uncertain how much of the funds 
were spend on Ebola and in the affected countries (Moon et al., 2015, p. 4).  
 
Kraut argues that medicalized nativism has existed for hundreds of years as a discourse to 
stereotype and stigmatize specific groups as carriers of specific diseases: “Nativists played on 
fears of disease, stereotyping foreigners as unclean, vulnerable, unhealthy, and a risk to the 
American population” (Kraut 1994, p. 86). Thereby creating medicalized nativism as a form 
of speech-act, in which groups of humans are labelled as medical threats making it a 
discourse of health securitization. Furthermore, the medicalized nativism discourse has been 
one of explicit racism and xenophobia, illustrated by examples of nativism converging with 
anti-Semitism to define Jews as genetically prone to both mental and physical degradation 
(Kraut, 1994, pp. 79-83). Similarly, the global responses including global media coverage 
and discursive reactions in global society to the 2014 Ebola crisis have involved several 
strands of Eurocentric or postcolonial notions of cultural differences and practices. An 
example of this was the cover of the US based magazine Newsweek, which featured a 
chimpanzee as the cover picture of the ebola edition of the magazine. The fear of the deadly 
Ebola disease has spread more widely and rapidly than the disease itself, with the panic and 
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narrative producing a stigmatization and shunning of people related to Ebola - be that actual 
patients or simply people who fit the ethnic profile of such, or the class perceived to be most 
infected. The fear have for instance halted tourism in many African countries CNN reports, 
with the managing director of a tourism bureau Brett Thompson stating the reason being the 
merging of said Ebola narrative with the discourse of Africa being a single country: “Even if 
we explain how far southern Africa is from West Africa, it does not change their mind. Africa 
is seen as a country and hardly ever as a continent.” (CNN, 2014). Since the virus spread to 
USA eight confirmed cases have been identified in the states. In October 2014 a Dallas news 
station brought a story of how neighbours of one confirmed Ebola patient was discriminated 
against out of fear that they might carry the deadly virus: “We still have some that have been 
turned away from jobs. Some that have been turned away at retail locations. We’re getting 
them in touch with legal aid and any resources necessary” (CBS, 2014). Similarly, a Texas 
news station described how a high school soccer player with Guinean heritage was chanted 
off the field with Ebola remarks (ABC, 2014). A final example of American stigmatization of 
Ebola, is the Navarro College rejecting applications from Nigerian students on the basis of 
Ebola fears, albeit it having no current cases at the time. The college publicly stated: “At this 
time, we believe it is the responsible thing to do to postpone our recruitment in those nations 
that the Centres for Disease Control and the US State Department have identified as at risk." 
(The Week 2014). Following Wald, these cases are examples of medicalized nativism and 
along with several other examples from the USA and Europe show the fear and 
stigmatization of West African people following the Ebola outbreak. 
 
The narrative of an outbreak having a spatial belonging often creates a divide between 
insiders and outsiders, locals and non-locals. In the case of Ebola this tendency to create a 
division between the diseased West-Africa (or for some, the entire continent of Africa) and 
the West can be seen in the large focus on containing the outbreak within nation, or regional 
borders through a rise in border security. The increased security has partaken in the bordering 
both of the countries with and without Ebola cases. The division can  be within a country as 
well between healthy and diseased areas, or quarantined and non-quarantined areas.  
 
Human Security and Sovereignty  
So far, the notion of security taken in this chapter has been in regard to the state as seen in the 
classical understanding presented by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. However, the notion of 
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security as being related to state sovereignty and territory has been challenged by the 
borderlessness of Ebola as previously argued.  
 
Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow (2002) add to this discussion by arguing that the 
classical understanding of security was challenged or developed upon from the end of the 
Cold War and onwards to incorporate Human Security. Human Security builds on the classic 
understanding of national security but includes a focus on the individual and consider 
poverty, health pandemics, and climate-related disasters as security threats. Human security 
builds on a frame of ethical SOPs for improving the coordination between NGOs, 
international organizations, and nation-states. The goal is to generate security for the people 
by focusing on social accountability to aid beneficiaries, which requires knowledge of the 
local rules, norms, and values (Deloffre, 2015, p. 14). Maryam Z. Deloffre (2015) argues for 
a change in discourse regarding humanitarian interventions following the new focus on 
Human Security. Human security is not a response to human rights violations but to public 
health crisis, thus a human security threat; “(...) the UN increasingly use the language of 
human security, they create the obligation to act and provide a new logic for humanitarian 
intervention.” (Deloffre, 2015, p. 13). This discourse of human security as an addition to both 
the classic understanding of security as well as to human rights is arguably a new way to 
legitimise interventions from Western actors into poor or developing countries.  
 
In the case of Ebola, the UN Security Council called the outbreak a threat to international 
peace and security. As previously mentioned, one of the ways the US responded to the Ebola 
outbreak was by situating 3,000 American troops on the grounds in Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
and Liberia in order to create stability. According to Deloffre the cooperation between 
military and NGOs, such as MSF, has for a long time been suffering, but the new focus on 
common values, which is embedded in the Human Security approach, might improve this 
relationship (Deloffre, 2015, p. 14). 
“While human security began as a project of middle power states, the United States’ Global 
Health Security Agenda and the UNSC declaration show that it now figures in the foreign 
policy of great powers. Embracing the human security agenda might generate global 
solutions to public health crisis (...).” (Deloffre 2015, p. 14) 
The human security paradigm is thus a merge of the classical security understanding and 
humanitarian notions of security for the individual. However, at the core of defining the 
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individual whose health is to be securitized lie postcolonial power relations. When speaking 
of individuals is there then an implicit distinction? Does it regard an individual from Sierra 
Leone or one from the Global West? This power of definition is not equally distributed across 
the globe, thus making the practice of human security accordingly unequal. Another aspect to 
this, as aforementioned, is the power to decide the target of said securitization; when one 
issue is addressed it often results in another being deselected. This has been the case during 
the outbreak as well, where treatment of other diseases has been downsized, as the healthcare 
sector in Sierra Leone has focused solely on Ebola during the outbreak, letting other diseases 
flourish inhibited, as well as the number of health workers no longer able to work, due to 
death or implications of the Ebola outbreak (BBC, 2014b). 
 
To assert the effects on development in Sierra Leone it is important to take the previous civil 
wars of the country into account, as the context of the country has left the health sector and 
other government organs in ruins, hence not having a working health sector prior to the 
outbreak. The healthcare sector has suffered many structural deficits and was not capable of 
meeting even the most basic needs prior to the outbreak, let alone after. One reason has been 
the major part played by donors in the development and organisation of the sector, herein the 
important power of deciding where their funds are channelled, thereby speaking into a debate 
on horizontal vs. vertical approaches to health care donation. The horizontal vs. vertical 
approach covers the discussion of whether donors should target their funds towards the fight 
of a specific disease, such as malaria, diarrhea, or HIV/AIDS, or if they should fund the 
general maintenance of the healthcare sector. The focus on ‘vertical’ or result-fixated health 
financing is expressed in the text by Giles-Vernick and Webb (2013) as they argue that:  
 
“Donor engagement with disease-specific programs has consistently reinforced a focus on 
the biological agents of Africa diseases, rather on the social determinants such as poverty, 
lack of access to resources, and income equalities.” (Giles-Vernick & Webb, 2013, p. 11).  
 
This focus is a product of the result-driven donor world and the discussion entails the 
aforementioned notion of power, as donors decide where their funds should go with the 
requirements this implies, which is seen in the budgets of WHO as well. This discussion is 
particular to the case of the Ebola outbreak, as donors in this period expected the government 
and the healthcare sector of Sierra Leone to channel as many resources as possible towards 
fighting the epidemic. The aforementioned choices and relations of power,  with the civil 
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wars taken into account, have shaped the structural problems in the healthcare sector and 
have restricted the development of the sector, as the government has not been able to allocate 
resources as they have seen fit and according to the needs of the country. One could argue 
that aid has not restricted the development of the healthcare sector, rather it has aided it in 
overcoming some otherwise insuperable challenges to the sector, such as HIV/AIDS, Guinea 
Worm, or Diarrhea.  
 
The concept of sovereignty applied in this discussion is rooted in classical notions of nation-
state borders (See Introduction, p. 10). However, in the case of Ebola in Sierra Leone, the 
disease has proven to be borderless, as shown by the rapid spread across borders and the way 
the virus travels through people. The notion of sovereignty is thus contested by this nature of 
the disease as classical nation-state borders cannot contain or control the disease. When 
investigating the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, it may be seen as a loss of sovereignty 
when international organisations and other countries intervene in such a manner as seen in the 
securitizing acts by WHO and USA among others. These interventions have been crucial to 
the outbreak response, however Sierra Leone did give up sovereignty to some degree in order 
to receive this aid - if not at the state level, then doubtlessly at the civil level; as exemplified 
in the case of the conflicting local norms and burial procedures, where the local people had to 
obey the burial procedures applied by the state of Sierra Leone, WHO, and other actors, even 
though they were in deep conflict with religious and cultural beliefs. Even though this act was 
crucial to containing the spread, it was indeed a deprivation of individual rights for the locals. 
Another example of this is the forced quarantines, which received criticism for lack of 
communication and cooperation leading to mistrust and breaches. Followingly it becomes 
relevant to wonder how much sovereignty Sierra Leone had the first place; can a country with 
a history of so much institutional instability and violence even be considered sovereign in any 
sense? Did they lose their sovereignty during the colonization and, if so, did they ever regain 
it? Sierra Leone was an European colony in the 1700’s and a centre for transatlantic slave 
trade. Such a voluminous violation of individual and human rights can, in a postcolonial 
scope, have skewed the mere existence of sovereignty and it is therefore complex to speak of 
sovereignty in the country today. Following this criticism, the appliance of the Human 
Security approach may then be another way to carry out postcolonial interventions without 
much regard to sovereignty. 
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Drawing on a postcolonial perspective, the relation between Sierra Leone’s sovereignty, their 
devastated health sector, and the development of the country are highly interlinked and all 
aspects affect the others. It is therefore difficult to identify any casualties between them and 
to define the chronological order of them. However, it can be found that the already 
challenged development in Sierra Leone was highly affected by the Ebola outbreak. Prior to 
the outbreak, the country was making economic progress after years of civil conflict, but the 
massive impact of the disease slowed the development, and the African Development Bank 
Group (ADBG) estimated a drop to 6% economic growth in 2014, -2,5% in 2015, and then a 
rise to 2,8% in 2016 and thus “The EVD [Ebola Virus Disease] crisis poses a great threat to 
macroeconomic stability, human development and poverty reduction.” (African Development 
Bank Group, 2015). ADBG argue that the Ebola virus had serious impacts on the national 
infrastructure, making it inefficient and thus posing a threat to private-sector development, 
which had seen some improvement prior to the outbreak. Furthermore, they argue that 
governance, gender, environment, and social indicators had all been improving prior to the 
outbreak and that considerable effort needs to be exerted by the government and development 
partners in order to regain development on these issues after the outbreak. Lastly, they 
identify a challenge regarding regional integration after the outbreak: “(...) challenges remain 
in the free movement of people and capital across the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) countries but the situation had been improving in recent years until the 
advent of the emergency restrictions imposed in the wake of the EVD outbreak” (African 
Development Bank Group, 2015), thus illustrating an implication of the securitization of the 
outbreak. This implication does not only affect the development in the country, but is 
furthermore a restriction on the free movement and individual rights of the people in the area. 
 
Summary 
Throughout the analysis and discussion on the case of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra 
Leone it has been found that through perceiving the disease as a threat and through different 
processes of speech-act, the health issue has been securitized. This securitization has 
happened through a cooperation between the government of Sierra Leone, national and 
international organisations, and contributions from other countries, including the United 
States of America. In the analysis of the response to the outbreak lies a critique of the time of 
each response, and of whether earlier intervention could have brought a different outcome. 
Much of the response have taken form of securitization through speech-acts of both explicit 
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and implicit character. This securitization is highly linked with bordering, as seen in the sense 
of identifying threats across borders as it has been the case because of the borderless nature of 
Ebola. Furthermore the securitizing responses have involved both physical and discursive 
forms of bordering; from airport and travel restrictions, to quarantined areas, to the isolating 
and stigmatizing narratives surrounding the individual victims and the countries affected by 
the disease. This stigmatization has proven to be of both international character as well as 
internal within the affected countries, where certain people were stereotyped and stigmatized 
in relation to the disease. The securitization and bordering of Ebola are found to carry several 
Eurocentric and postcolonial notions and are heavily linked to unequal global power 
relations, as it is seen in the examples of medicalized nativism and examples of racist 
prejudices and stereotypes affecting the coverage and the response to the outbreak. Prior to 
the Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone had experienced some improvements regarding both 
economic and social factors after years of civil war. The outbreak slowed down much of this 
development and had especially high impacts on the economic growth and the state of the 
health sector. Furthermore, Sierra Leone did give up sovereignty to some degree when 
receiving assistance from securitizing actors through acts bound to the notion human security, 
however it can be discussed how sovereign the country was before the outbreak, due to the 
history of colonialism and violation of human rights. 
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